Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2008

Becky Sue Myers v. Tracy Lynn Myers : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Guy L. Black; Greenwood & Black; Attorney for Respondent/Appellee.
Samuel M. Barker; Jeffrey A. Callister; Smart, Schofield, Shorter & Lunceford; Attorneys for
Petitioner/Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Becky Sue Myers v. Tracy Lynn Myers, No. 20080911 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2008).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/1256

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
BECKY SUE MYERS,
Petitioner/Appellant,
vs.

District Court No. 064400347
Appellate No. 20080911

TRACY LYNN MYERS,
Respondent/Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER
MODIFYING DECREE OF DIVORCE, OF THE UTAH FOURTH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, TN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY,
THE HONORABLE SAMUEL MCVEY PRESIDING

Guy L. Black, #6182
Greenwood & Black
Attorney for Respondent/Appellee
1840 North State Street, #200
Provo,Utah 84604
Telephone: (801) 377-4652
Facsimile: (801)377-4673

Samuel M. Barker, #6073
Jeffrey A. Callister, #9962
Smart, Schofield, Shorter & Lunceford
A Professional Corporation
Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellant
5295 South Commerce Drive, Suite 200
Murray, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 747-0647
Facsimile: (801)747-1049

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
BECKY SUE MYERS,
Petitioner/Appellant,
vs.

District Court No. 064400347
Appellate No. 20080911

TRACY LYNN MYERS,
Respondent/Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER
MODIFYING DECREE OF DIVORCE, OF THE UTAH FOURTH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY,
THE HONORABLE SAMUEL MCVEY PRESIDING

Guy L. Black, #6182
Greenwood & Black
Attorney for Respondent/Appellee
1840 North State Street, #200
Provo,Utah 84604
Telephone: (801)377-4652
Facsimile: (801) 377-4673

. Samuel M. Barker, #6073
Jeffrey A. Callister, #9962
Smart, Schofield, Shorter & Lunceford
A Professional Corporation
Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellant
5295 South Commerce Drive, Suite 200
Murray, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801)747-0647
Facsimile: (801) 747-1049

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

.

iii

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF
APPELLATE REVIEW

1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS

4

ARGUMENT SUMMARY

5

ARGUMENT

7

L

THE TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATION THAT PETITIONER WAS
COHABITATING AND NO LONGER ENTITLED TO ALIMONY
SHOULD BE REVERSED
7
A.

The Trial Court's Ultimate Determination that Petitioner Shared a
Common Residence with Another was Incorrect, and Should be
Reversed
8
1.

B.

There was no Evidence that Petitioner Shared Living
Expenses with Mr. Hart

.9

2.

There was no Evidence that Petitioner and Mr. Hart had
Access to Each Other's Living Quarters in the Residence ..11

3.

There was no Evidence that Petitioner ate Regularly with Mr.
Hart, Shared Food Expenses, or Kept Clothing or other
Personal Items in His Room
13

The Trial Court's Findings of Fact that Petitioner was Engaged in a
Sexual Relationship with Mr. Hart are Clearly Erroneous. Further,
the Ultimate Conclusion of the Trial Court Regarding Sexual
Contact was also Incorrect and Should be Reversed
. .15

i

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

L

2.

The Findings of the Trial Court that there was a Sexual
Relationship Between Petitioner and Mr. Hart were Clearly
Erroneous .

15

The Trial Court's Ultimate Conclusion that there was a Sexual
Relationship Between Petitioner and Mr. Hart was Incorrect and
Should be Reversed
,
46

CONCLUSION

47

ADDENDA
Addendum A - Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law7
Addendum B - Order Modifying Decree of Divorce
Addendum C - Affidavit of Bryce Myers
Addendum D - Affidavit of Misty Myers
Addendum E - Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103 (1953 as amended)
Addendum F - Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1953 as amended)
Addendum G - Utah R. App. P. 24
Addendum H - Utah R. App. P. 3

ii

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
STATE CASES
Jensen v. Jensen, 2007 UT App 377,173 P.3d 223
Pendleton v. Pendleton, 918 P.2d 159 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)
Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d 669 (Utah 1985)

2,7,9,10,11,12,13,14
2,7,8,9,11,13,14,15,45
2,7,8,9,11,13,15,44,45,46

Sigg v. Sigg, 905 P.2d 908 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)

10,11,13,14,44,45

Peterson v. Peterson, 818 P.2d 1305 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)

16

Wackerv. Wacker, 668 P.2d 533 (Utah 1983)

45

Garcia v. Garcia, 2002 UT App. 381, 60 P.3d 1174

45

STATE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103 (1953 as amended)

1

UtahR. App. P. 3

1

Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5

2,4,8

UtahR. App. P. 24

v.

•

m

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3,16

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
BECKY SUE MYERS,
Petitioner/Appellant,

District Court No. 064400347
Appellate No. 20080911

vs.
TRACY LYNN MYERS,
Respondent/Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Order
Modifying Decree of Divorce, of the Utah Fourth Judicial District Court, in and for Utah
County, the Honorable Samuel McVey presiding. Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is
conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section
78A-4-103(2)(h) (1953 as amended) and Rule 3(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Issue: Did the trial court err when it found that Petitioner was cohabitating and
terminated Respondent's obligation to pay further alimony, when Petitioner did not have
a common residency with another or sexual contact with another?

1
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Standard of Review: "Whether cohabitation exists 'is a mixed question of fact
and law. While we defer to the trial court's factual findings unless they are shown to be
clearly erroneous, we review its ultimate conclusion for correctness.5" Jensen v. Jensen,
2007 UT App 377, If 2, 173 P.3d 223 (Utah Ct. App. 2007), quoting Pendleton v.
Pendleton, 918 P.2d 159, 160 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). See also Haddow v. Haddow, 707
P.2d 669, 671 (Utah 1985) ("the determination of whether given circumstances constitute
cohabitation requires the application of the terms of a court order to a given set of facts.
This process is in reality a mixed question of fact and law, and we are not bound by the
conclusion reached by the trial court.5') Because this is an appeal of the findings of fact
and conclusions of law/ultimate conclusion of the trial court, the issue presented on
appeal was preserved via timely filing of the Notice of Appeal R, at 200-199.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The following Constitutional Provisions, Statutes and Rules are relevant to this
appeal:
Statutes:
1.

Utah Code Annotated Section 30-3-5(8)(g)(i) and (10) (1953 as

amended):
\\

(8)(g)(i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes
and new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial material change in
circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce.
(10) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former
spouse is cohabitating with another person.
2
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Rules:
1.

Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(9):

A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all
record evidence that supports the challenged finding . . .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The parties in this matter were divorced in June of 2006. R at 188: 1,] As part of
the Decree of Divorce, Petitioner, Becky Sue Myers ("Petitioner"), was awarded
alimony. R. at 188-187: 2,
Respondent, Tracy Lynn Myers ("Respondent") filed a Petition to Modify Decree
of Divorce on January 31,2008. R at 94-92. In that Petition, Respondent alleged that
Petitioner was cohabitating, further, that Respondent could no longer pay alimony, and
that alimony should be terminated. R. at 94: 3,4 and 93: 5. On April 30, 2008,
Petitioner filed her Verified Answer to Respondent's Petition to Modify Divorce Decree,
denying the allegations. R. at 146-142.
A bench trial was held in regard to this matter on July 1, 2008, before the
Honorable Samuel McVey. R. at 176. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
were signed and entered on October 6, 2008. R. at 188-184. An Order Modifying
Decree of Divorce was signed and entered on Octobbr 6, 2008. R. at 191-192. In
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the trial court stated in its

1

There will be two separate citations to the Record on Appeal in this Brief. The court
record of pleadings and papers shall be referred to as "R. page number." The Transcript
of Proceedings shall be referred to as "Tr. page number."
3
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conclusions that "[p]ursuant to Section 30-3-5(10), an order for alimony in this
case terminates upon establishment by the Respondent that Petitioner is
cohabitating with another person." R. at 184:6. This conclusion was based in part
on the following:
14. Petitioner's parents tried to control Mike Hart and prevent
any sexual relationship involving Mike Hart. However, they
were unable to control him and prevent such contact
between Mr. Hart and the Petitioner.
16. There was a sexual relationship between Petitioner and Mike
Hart, which the Court infers from the common residency of
the Petitioner and Mike Hart, and which is corroborated by
the evidence that Petitioner elected to spend the night with
Mike Hart in Salt Lake City.
17. The Court believes that the most credible evidence before the
Court indicates that Petitioner and Mike Hart had a sexual
relationship.
R. at 186: 14 & 16, 185: 16, 17.
As a result, the trial court ordered that "Respondent's obligation to pay Petitioner
alimony is terminated in this case, effective January 31, 2008/' R» at 192: 1. This appeal
followed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties were divorced in June of 2006. R-at 188:1. Following the divorce,
Petitioner moved in with her parents in or around the Spring of 2007. R. at 187:3. While
living at her parents' house, Petitioner slept on a couch. Tr. at 12: 24. Petitioner's
parents allow foster boys to live with them in the home, and did during the period that
Petitioner was staying with her parents. Tr. at 128: 17-19. At the time, a foster child
4
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named Michael Hart wras staying at the residence, Tr. at 127: 2-4 and 132: 15. While
staying there, Mr. Hart had a room that he stayed in with another foster child. Tr. at 107:
4-7. Respondent alleged that Appellant cohabitated with Mr. Hart, having sexual contact
and sharing a common residence with him. R. at 93: 5.

At the conclusion of proceedings, the trial court determined that Petitioner and Mr.
Hart were sharing a common residence and had a sexual relationship. R, at 186:16 and
185:16. Alimony was terminated effective January 31,2008. R. at 192:1.
ARGUMENT SUMMARY
The trial court's determination to terminate Petitioner's right to alimony from
Respondent should be reversed because Petitioner was not cohabitating. Cohabitation
requires (1) common residency and (2) sexual contact evidencing a conjugal association.
The standard of review clearly states that whether cohabitation exists is a mixed question
of fact and law. Specifically, the factual findings of the trial court are reviewed under a
clearly erroneous standard, while the ultimate conclusion of the trial court is reviewed for
correctness.

°\

First, the trial court's ultimate conclusion that Petitioner and Michael Hart shared
a common residency is incorrect. There was no evidence presented that Petitioner and
Mr. Hart shared living expenses, that Petitioner had free access to Mr. Hart's living
quarters, or that Petitioner ate meals regularly with Mr. Hart, shared food expenses with
him or kept clothing or other personal items in his living quarters. The only evidence
5
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regarding a common residency was that the two shared the same address for
approximately four months. This type of living arrangement is more akin to that of a
boarding house or basement tenant, where the tenants may share the same physical
address, but are not cohabitating. Therefore, the trial court's ultimate conclusion in
regard to a common residency should be reversed.
Second, the trial court's findings in regard to sexual contact between Petitioner
and Mr. Hart were clearly erroneous, and as a result, the trial court's ultimate conclusion
in this regard was also incorrect. There was no direct evidence presented to the trial court
showing sexual contact, or that Petitioner and Mr. Hart kissed, hugged or even held
hands. In fact, the trial court's findings at one point state that the trial court was inferring
a sexual relationship existed. The nature of this finding is problematic when viewing
other cases where cohabitation was found to exist. Specifically, in those matters sexual
contact was generally admitted to or the evidence was clear and direct that there was
sexual contact. Therefore, the trial court's findings in this regard were clearly erroneous.
Finally, because of the erroneousfindings,the trial court's ultimate conclusion in regard
^:

to sexual contact was incorrect.

Therefore, the trial court's ruling that Petitioner cohabitated and was no longer
entitled to alimony from Respondent should be reversed.

6
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATION THAT PETITIONER WAS
COHABITATING AND NO LONGER ENTITLED TO ALIMONY
SHOULD BE REVERSED.
The trial court in this matter determined incorrectly that it was appropriate to

terminate Petitioner's right to receive alimony from Respondent. R, at 192: 1. In making
this determination, the trial court concluded that "[fjhere was a sexual relationship
between Petitioner and Mike Hart, which the Court infers from the common residency of
the Petitioner and Mike Hart, and which is corroborated by the evidence that Petitioner
elected to spend the night with Mike Hart in Salt Lake City." R. 186485:16. Further,
that "Petitioner and Mike Hart had a common residency." R. at 185: 3. The applicable
standard of review instructs "[w]hether cohabitation exists 'is a mixed question of fact
and law. While we defer to the trial court's factual findings unless they are shown to be
clearly erroneous, we review its ultimate conclusion for correctness."5 Jensen v. Jensen,
2007 UT App 377, f 2, 173 P.3d 223, quoting Pendleton v. Pendleton, 918 P.2d 159, 160
(Utah Ct. App. 1996); See also Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d 669, 671 (Utah 1985) ("the
determination of whether given circumstances constitute cohabitation requires the
application of the terms of a court order to a given set of facts. This process is in reality a
mixed question of fact and law, and we are not bound by the conclusion reached by the
trial court.")
Cohabitation requires "(1) common residency and (2) sexual contact evidencing a
conjugal association." Pendleton, 918 P.2d at 160, n.l. Under the above standard and
7

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

this definition, the trial court's ultimate conclusions must be reversed. Specifically, the
facts simply do not support a determination that Petitioner was truly "cohabitating with
another person." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(10). First, the evidence does not support the
trial court's ultimate conclusion that there was a common residence between Petitioner
and Mr. Hart. Second, the trial court's findings and its ultimate conclusion that there was
a sexual relationship between Petitioner and Mr. Hart were also incorrect.
A.

THE TRIAL COURT'S ULTIMATE DETERMINATION THAT
PETITIONER SHARED A COMMON RESIDENCE WITH ANOTHER
WAS INCORRECT, AND SHOULD BE REVERSED.
Cohabitation requires "(1) common residency and (2) sexual contact evidencing a

conjugal association." Pendleton, 918 P.2d at 160, n.l.

Common residency is

defined as requiring "the sharing of a common abode that both parties consider their
principal domicile for more than a temporary or brief period of time." Haddow, 707 P.2d
at 672. Further, common residency "implies continuity, not simply a habit of visiting or a
sojourn." Pendleton, 918 P.2d at 160. While the definition appears simple, the factors
that should be considered in reaching that conclusion complicate the inquiry. The
reviewing courts in Utah have had opportunities to review the determinations of trial
courts regarding whether or not a particular individual is sharing a common residency
with another. By considering the underlying determinative facts in the most relevant
cases, when compared to the present matter, it is clear that the trial court's ultimate
conclusion in regard to common residency was incorrect and should be reversed.

8
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1.

THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT PETITIONER SHARED
LIVING EXPENSES WITH MR. HART.
While it is not dispositive of whether or not a common residence is shared, the

sharing of living expenses is a relevant factor that should be considered. See Haddow,
707 P.2d at 673-674. In this case, there was no evidence of any sharing of living
expenses between Petitioner and Mr. Hart. In Haddow, the Utah Supreme Court stated
that "[although we do not consider the sharing of the financial obligations surrounding
the maintenance of a household to be a requisite element of cohabitation, we do find it
significant that Mr. Hudson did not pay any of appellant's living expenses or consistently
share with her any of his assets.5' Id. at 673. Further, "Mr. Hudson did not contribute
anything to appellant's mortgage payments, the insurance on her house, or her utility
bills/' Id. at 673-4. Ultimately, the Court determined that there was not a common
residency present. Id, In Pendleton, the Utah Court of Appeals confirmed that the
sharing of living expenses is an important, though not dispositive factor, stating
"[ajlthough neither the presence of portable possessions nor the sharing of living
expenses is dispositive, either may nonetheless be indicative of maintaining a shared
household and be regarded as some evidence of residency." 918 P.2d at 160. Also,
"[f]or example, while it is not important if the two sliare assets in a general sense, it may
indeed be relevant if one party pays the other's mortgage, the insurance on his or her
house, or the utility bills-actions which would be quite atypical for a mere visitor, even a
regular and frequent visitor." Id. at 160-1. In Jensen, the Utah Court of Appeals found
that, amongst other factors, the lack of shared expenses was relevant, finding "[t]he
9

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

evidence does not indicate that Wife shared living or food expenses with Mr. Andrews."
2007 UT App. 377, f 3. The Court of Appeals ultimately upheld the trial court's
determination that there was not a shared residence. Id, Finally, in Sigg v. Sigg, the Utah
Court of Appeals found the following to be relevant indicators of a common residency:
The two had a sexual relationship, shared living expenses, had open access
to each other's condominiums, ate together and shared food expenses, kept
clothing in the same condominium, used the same furniture and 'otherwise
lived as though they were husband and wife.'
905 P.2d 908, 918 (Utah Ct App. 1995) (emphasis added).
There was no evidence submitted to the trial court indicating that Petitioner shared
living expenses with Mr. Hart. In fact, quite the opposite was true. Rather than receiving
financial help from Mr. Hart, the testimony at trial indicated that Petitioner's living
situation was somewhat bleak; she had even resigned herself to living at her parents'
home on the couch. See Tr. at 12:24,106:1-2 and 107:1-3. Further, even in the findings
of fact, the only finding of that trial court that would even remotely indicate any sharing
of living expenses was the statement that "Petitioner was seen in a familial relationship,
paired up with Mike H a r t . . . . " R. at 186:13. Again, while it is true that the sharing of
living expenses is not dispositive, it is a factor that the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah
Court of Appeals have considered important and placed emphasis on in reaching the
ultimate conclusion of whether or not an individual is sharing a common residence with
another. Therefore, it should be considered relevant that Petitioner was never found to be
sharing living or other expenses with Mr. Hart.

10
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2.

THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT PETITIONER AND MR.
HART HAD ACCESS TO EACH OTHER'S LIVING QUARTERS IN
THE RESIDENCE,
It is also relevant that neither Petitioner nor Mr. Hart had access to the other's

living quarters in the residence. In Pendleton, where the Utah Court of Appeals did find
a common residency, it was relevant that the boyfriend "had his own key to Joyce's
home/' that "he came and went from Joyce's home three to four times daily, even when
she was not there." 918 P.2d at 161 _ The Utah Supreme Court also found a common
residency in Sigg, where despite the fact that a couple had "separate condominiums in the
same condominium complex," they had "open access to each other's condominiums."
905 P.2d at 917-918. Consider also Haddow, a case where common residency was found
not to exist, where the Utah Supreme Court found the following:
The trial court made no finding that Mr. Hudson either spent any time at the
home when appellant was not there or had a key to the house. These
circumstances seem particularly significant on the question of whether Mr.
Hudson was living with appellant, since a resident will come and go as he
pleases in his own home, while a visitor, however regular and frequent, will
schedule his visits to coincide with the presence of the person he is visiting.
707 P.2d at 673. Finally, in Jensen, the Utah Court of Appeals found a common
residency did not exist where the Respondent did not have "open access to the
Andrewses' home." 2007 UT App. 377, ^ 3. The facts in that case indicated that "Wife
lived in the same residence as Mr. Andrews off and on for two months, sharing a
bedroom with Mr. Andrews's sister." Id. at f 2. Further, that "Wife did not have a key to
the Andrewses' home, had only some of her clothing and toiletries with her during her
stay." Id. at % 3.
11
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This case presents a unique fact pattern. The evidence presented indicated that
while Petitioner and Mr. Hart were staying in the same residence, they maintained
separate living quarters. See R. at 186: 9; Tr. at 12:24, 106:1-2 & 17-23, and 107:1-7.
Specifically, Petitioner would stay on the couch while Mr. Hart had his own room, which
was shared with a roommate. See R. at 186: 9; Tr, at 12:24, 106:1-2 & 17-23, and 107:17. What is significant under these facts is that Petitioner did not have open or unfettered
access to Mr. Hart's living area. While there was some evidence that Petitioner was
found sleeping in the same room with Mr. Hart, while he was on the floor and she was on
the couch, this was not a bedroom, but rather a common area. Tr. at 103:25; 104: 1-2;
and 107: 8-11. But of particular importance was the lack of evidence that Petitioner
would frequent Mr. Hart's living area, or room, when he was not there. While it could be
argued that perhaps Mr. Hart had open access to Petitioner's "living area" it was not at
the exclusion of others. It was simply a product of the fact that Petitioner was staying in
a common area of the residence. This situation should be viewed as being one similar to
a boarding house arrangement, or to that of an individual living in a basement apartment.
While the tenants in the boarding house, or the tenant in a basement apartment, may share
the same physical residence or address, the living quarters are separate and distinct from
each other.
In Jensen, while not exactly the same fact pattern existed, it is significant that the
party in that case was found not to share a common residence with her boyfriend even
though she stayed at her boyfriend's residence "off and on for two months," and shared
12
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"a bedroom with Mr. Andrews's sister." 2007 UT App. 377, f 2. Similarly here, while
Petitioner was staying at the same residence, she and Mr. Hart maintained separate living
arrangements. See R. at 186: 9; Tr. at 12:24, 106:1-2 & 17-23, and 107:1-7. Finally, as
was noted above, the Utah Court of Appeals and Supreme Court of Utah have found it
significant if a cohabitating individual had a key to another's residence. See Pendleton,
918 P,2d at 161; Haddow, 707 P.2d at 673; SUgg, 905 P.2d at 917-918; and Jensen, 2007
UT App. 377, If 3. While Petitioner may have had open access to the residence, she did
not have open access to Mr. Hart's room. This should be considered the same situation
as an individual lacking a key, or access, to another's residence.
3,

THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT PETITIONER ATE REGULARLY
WITH MR. HART, SHARED FOOD EXPENSES, OR KEPT CLOTHING
OR OTHER PERSONAL ITEMS IN HIS ROOM.
There was also an absence of evidence indicating that Petitioner took meals

regularly with Mr. Hart, shared food expenses or kept clothing and other personal
belongings in his room. In Haddow, it was significant that the boyfriend "did not move
any furniture into appellant's home or keep there any personal items other than toiletry
articles, a few items of clothing . . . and one picture album." 707 P.2d at 673. Further, in
Jensen, "Wife . .. had only some of her clothing and toiletries wither her during her
stay," 2007 UT App. 377, f 3. Where a common residence has been established, the
Utah Court of Appeals found it important in Pendleton that "Joyce and Bill ate almost all
meals together when Bill was in town-invariably at Joyce's house," and "Bill kept
clothing and other personal effects at Joyce's home." 918 P.2d at 161.
13
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In this case, there was simply no evidence presented that Petitioner shared meals
and food expenses with Mr. Hart, or kept clothing in his room. There was some evidence
that Petitioner and Mr. Hart may have attended some parties or social gatherings together,
but nothing that would make this situation comparable to the one described above in
Pendleton. Tr. at 118: 16-21. As stated earlier, Petitioner did not have open access to
Mr. Hart's living quarters. R. at 186: 9; Tr. at 12:24, 106:1-2 & 17-23, and 107:1-7.
Also, the evidence presented at trial was devoid of any indication that Petitioner had
personal effects or clothing stored in Mr. Hart's room.
*

*

*

At the heart of any determination that cohabitation exists, and subsequently
common residence, is whether the parties "lived as though they were husband and wife."
Sigg9 905 P.2d at 918. Based on the above factors indicated in subparagraphs one
through three, the only reasonable conclusion is that Petitioner and Mr. Hart were not
living as husband and wife or sharing a common residence. Here there was no common
sharing of expenses, no free or common access to Mr. Hart's living quarters, sharing of
food expenses or the storing of personal items. Simply sharing the same address should
not be viewed as enough on its own. As a result, the "ultimate conclusion" of the trial
court that there was a common residence was incorrect, and must be reversed. Jensen,
2007UTApp.377,12.

14
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B.

THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT THAT PETITIONER WAS
ENGAGED IN A SEXUAL RELATIONSHIP WITH MR- HART ARE
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS, FURTHER, THE ULTIMATE CONCLUSION
OF THE TRIAL COURT REGARDING SEXUAL CONTACT WAS ALSO
INCORRECT AND SHOULD BE REVERSED.
Even if the trial court's ultimate conclusion that a common residence was shared

between Petitioner and Mr. Hart was not in error, its findings of fact and ultimate
conclusion that there was a sexual relationship between the two must be reversed.
Cohabitation requires "(1) common residency and (2) sexual contact evidencing a
conjugal association." Pendleton, 918 P.2d at 160, n.L Sexual contact is defined as
"participation in a relatively permanent sexual relationship akin to that generally existing
between husband and wife/' Haddow, 707 P,2d at 672. First, the findings of fact that
there was any kind of sexual relationship between Petitioner and Mr. Hart were clearly
erroneous. Second, and as a result of the erroneous findings, the ultimate conclusion of
the trial court was incorrect and must be reversed.
1.

THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THERE WAS A SEXUAL
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PETITIONER AND MR. HART WERE
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.
Petitioner challenges the findings of fact made by the trial court that there was a

sexual relationship between Petitioner and Mr. Hart. The trial court found the following:
14.

Petitioner's parents tried to control Mike Hart and prevent
any sexual relationship involving Mike Hart. However, they
were unable to control him and prevent such contact
between Mr. Hart and the Petitioner.

16.

There was a sexual relationship between Petitioner and Mike
Hart, which the Court infers from the common residency of
the Petitioner and Mike Hart, and which is corroborated by
15
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the evidence that Petitioner elected to spend the night with
Mike Hart in Salt Lake City.
17.

The Court believes that the most credible evidence before the Court
indicates that Petitioner and Mike Hart had a sexual relationship.

R. at 186: 14 & 16, 185: 16 and 17.
The Rules of Appellate Procedure state "[a] party challenging a fact finding must
first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding." Utah R> App. P.
24(a)(9). Further, Respondent must "marshal all evidence in favor of the facts as found
by the trial court and then demonstrate that even viewing the evidence in a light most
favorable to the court below, the evidence is insufficient to support the findings of fact."
Peterson v. Peterson, 818 P.2d 1305, 1308 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). After marshaling the
evidence, it is clear that the trial court's findings of fact in regard to sexual contact
between Petitioner and Mr. Hart were clearly erroneous.
The Marshaled Evidence in Support of the Finding:
Testimony of Douglas Hale Huntsman:
Mr, Huntsman is a private investigator who was working in behalf of Respondent,
r

Tr. at 7: 13-22.

\

Mr. Black: And, and when you say you conducted surveillance, what did you do?
Mr. Huntsman: He, he indicated that she was living at her parents' house in
Provo. And I went to that address and set up surveillance. He gave me the
description of her, a green Isuzu Trooper. And a, I started on June 26 th of 2007
and I was there real early in the morning, approximately 6:30. And approximately
16
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five minutes to 8:00 that morning I observed her getting into the a,.. The vehicle
was parked on the back side of the house. There's, the house is located on a
corner, There's a driveway on the back side, there's a basketball standard right
near the driveway. And a, the vehicle was parked there backed in. And observed
her getting in the vehicle driver side. Hispanic male with a bandana, a juvenile at
the driver's door, looked like they were talking for about a minute. And then the
male went around the front of the vehicle, got in the passenger side. And the
vehicle started, smoked excessively, and headed eastbound towards Independence
High School, and stopped at Independence High School in the student drop off
area, Tr. at 8: 5-25.
They were there, they were parked there for approximately five minutes. I
couldn't see what was going on in the vehicle due to the congestion in the parking
lot. But then the, the boy exited the car, went to school. And then she drove back
to the residence. Tr. at 9: 1-5.
Testimony of Petitioner:
Mr. Black: So you, when you staying at your parents' house they were also
there?
Petitioner: Yes.
Mr. Black: So Mike was at your parents' house while you were staying there? Tr.
at 32: 22-25 and 33: L

17
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Testimony of Petitioner Continued:
Mr. Black: Have you ever gone anywhere alone with Mike?
Petitioner: Yes.
Mr. Black: Where have you gone alone with Mike?
Petitioner: We've... I take him, I take them to the store if they need it. He's the
only one of the boys that did not work full-time. And they got allotments every
month. I took him shopping to Jenex (phonetic) a couple times. I, I took him,
wrell51 took all of the boys to school. We went to my daughter's house. Just
average places. I never...I guess I don't know what you're meaning. I took him
down to the gas station, I took him to get gas for the lawn mower before.
Mr. Black: And did you ever take him to family reunions?
Petitioner: Yes, I did. All of the boys, Tr. 33:9-23.
Testimony of Respondent:
Mr. Barker: Now you're . . . I just want to change gears just for a second. You're
claiming that, that Becky has been cohabitating with a, with a 16 year old boy.
What, what, what is your evidence of that? Could you j ust tell us?
Respondent: My own personal evidence?
Mr. Barker: Yes.
Respondent: Other than me just seeing them together and witnessing them
together and knowing that she was living there. Tr. at 90: 13-21.

18
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Testimony of Bryce Robert Myers:
Bryce Robert Myers is Petitioner and Respondent's son. Tr. at 98: 6-8
Mr. Black: Show you what was marked as EXHIBIT #4, Is that the affidavit that
you signed?
Mr. Myers: Yes.
Mr. Black: Okay. Is everything in that affidavit true and correct?
Mr. Myers: Yes,
Mr. Black: In paragraph 3 of that affidavit you said that you did not have any
doubt that your mother Becky Sue Myers was having a sexual relationship with
Mike, a foster boy, during the time that both of them lived with your grandmother
from about May through August 2007. Is that, is that correct?
Mr. Myers: No.
Mr. Black: What do you mean no? That's not, I didn't read it correctly?
Mr. Myers: I don't have proof of the sexual relationship.
Mr. Black: You said you had no doubt. What was it in your mind that caused you
to have no doubt?
Mr. Myers: My understanding is they had a relationship.
Mr. Black: Okay. How did you obtain that understanding?
Mr. Myers: Well they, they spent time together, they hung out together. But I
have no idea about the sexual part.
Mr. Black: Okay. Did Mike speak about your mom as though he were his
19
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girlfriend?
Mr. Myers: A little bit.
Mr. Black: So what did Mike say to you that gave you the impression that they
were boyfriend and girlfriend?
Mr. Mvers: He never actually told me they were boyfriend and girlfriend. He
would just come to me when they weren't getting along, for support: wrhen he was
angry.
Mr. Black: Can you give me an example of a situation like that? And kind of
explain for the court what the interaction was between you and him?
Mr. Mvers: What do you mean, interaction?
Mr. Black: Well, can you think of a specific instance where he came to you and
was angry?
Mr. Myers: Not off the top of my head, no.
Mr. Black: Okay. Did you ever see a, Mike and a, your mom flirting with each
other?
Mr. Mvers: I wouldn't say flirting.

-

Mr. Black: Look at paragraph 4 of your affidavit, second sentence of that, of that
paragraph. Didn't you say, I saw them flirting with each other all the time.
Mr. Mvers: That's what I wrote.
Mr. Black: Is that true?
Mr. Myers: Yes and no,
20
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Mr. Black: What do you mean yes and no?
Mr. Myers: Well, Mike was a good guy. He was, he was a, I don't know, like just
the wray he approaches things was really nice about things. And they would just...
I don't know how to word it Tr. at 98: 17-25; 99: 146; 100: 17-25; and 101: 120.
Testimony of Bryce Robert Myers Continued:
Mr. Black: So did you see your mom and Mike flirting with each other?
Mr. Myers: Yes, sir,
Mr. Black: And a, did you also see that they slept in the same room together?
Mr. Myers: One time, sir.
Mr. Black: Okay. Did they ever try to hide the fact that they were sleeping in the
same room together?
Mr. Myers: It wasn't, that wasn't a matter, sir.
Mr. Black: I'm sorry?
Mr. Myers: That wasn't a matter.
Mr. Black: What do you mean? I'm not, I don't understand your answer. What
do you mean by that wasn't a matter?
Mr. Myers: Well, no.
Mr. Black: No what?
Mr. Myers: No to your question.
Mr. Black: No, there weren't trying to hide that fact?
21
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Mr. Myers: Yes.
Mr. Black: they were sleeping in the same room together but not hiding it?
Mr. Myers: Yes.
Mr. Black: Did you ever encounter your mom and Mike downstairs on the couch
sleeping together?
Mr. Myers: Not together, no. Mike would come down to sleep on the floor and
she slept on the couch.
Mr. Black: So she would be on the couch and he would sleep on the floor?
Mr. Myers: Yes.
Mr. Black: Even though he had his own bedroom?
Mr. Myers: Yes.
Mr. Black: And you found them in that position?
Mr. Myers: Yes. They weren't actually sleeping. It was more in the late
afternoon. Tr. at 103: 22-25; 104: 147; and 107: 849.
Testimony of Bryce Robert Myers Continued:
Mr. Black: During May of 2007 did Mike go to you crying because he had had a
fight with your mom?
Mr. Myers: Yes, sir.
Mr. Black: And a, what was your understanding regarding the reason that, that he
was crying about that fight?
Mr. Myers: They weren't getting along, they had a dispute, and his temper was
22
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flaring and he took off.
Mr. Black: Okay. Did he act like a heartsick love, a heartbroken lovesick boy?
Mr. Myers: Not really.
Mr. Black: What do you mean not really? Did he or didn't he? What was it—
Mr. Myers: No.
Mr. Black: In your Affidavit you said, He acted like a heartbroken lovesick boy.
Paragraph 5 of your affidavit. Is that a true statement?
Mr. Myers: I didn't' write that
Mr. Black: Did you sign this affidavit?
Mr. Myers: Yes.
Mr. Black: Did you read it before you've signed it?
Mr. Myers: Probably not
Mr. Black: So, so was, so what was he acting like?
Mr. Myers: He was acting upset.
Mr. Black: Did you have, was there an incident on the 4th of July of 2007?
Mr. Myers: Yes, Sir.

''%

Mr. Black: And a, did your mom call you while you and Mike were at a friend's
house?
Mr. Myers: Yes, sir.
Mr. Black: And is it true that your mom flew into a jealous rage over the phone?
Mr. Myers: Yes.
23
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Mr. Black: Okay. And is that because she thought Mike was hanging out with
some other girls?
Mr. Myers: Yes.
Mr. Black: Okay. Did, did she tell you that she was done with him because he
was cheating on her?
Mr. Myers: I don't know that, no.
Mr. Black: Look at paragraph 6 of your affidavit, the last sentence. Do you say in
that affidavit, She told me she was done with him because he was cheating on her?
Mr. Myers: Yes.
Mr. Black: Okay. Did the same jealous behavior happen on more than one
occasion?
Mr. Myers: Maybe once, one other time.
Mr. Black: Okay. Was she jealous if, if Mike was out with somebody else and
not with her?
Mr. Myers: No,
Mr. Black: Isn't that what you said in paragraph 7 of your affidavit? Didn't you
say, She had to be with Mike all the time or she became jealous?
Mr. Myers: I may have wrote that. But, no.
Mr. Black: Did some time in August Mike go to you and tell you again that he
had gotten into another fight with your mom?
Mr. Myers: Say that again.
24
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Mr. Black: In August of 2007 did Mike go to you again and tell you that he had
gotten into a fight with your mom?
Mr. Myers: Yes.
Mr. Black: And a, did he tell you that he had punched out a window of her car?
Mr. Myers: No. I was told by somebody else.
Mr. Black: So he didn't tell you that?
Mr, Myers: No.
Mr. Black: Who told you that?
Mr. Myers: I don't even remember.
107: 21-25; 108: 1-2 & 13-25; 109: 1-25; and 110: 1-25.
Testimony of Bryce Robert Myers Continued:
Mr. Black: Did you say in your affidavit that he as moved up to Salt Lake?
Mr. Myers: Yes.
Mr. Black: Okay. Did your mom go to you shortly after Mike moved and ask if
she could take your car to Salt Lake to see Mike?
Mr, Myers: Yes.

%

Mr. Black: And did you call your mom the next morning because she hadn't yet
returned the car?
Mr, Myers: Yes.
Mr, Black: And did you tell her you needed to have your car back to go to work?
Mr. Myers: Yes.
25
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Mr. Black: Did she tell you she had just left Mike's house and was on her way
back?
Mr. Myers: Yes. Tr. I l l : 19-25 and 112: 1-9.
Testimony of Misty Lynn Myers:
Misty Lynn Myers is Petitioner and Respondent's daughter. Tr. at 114: 17-19.
Mr. Black: Okay. Did you prepare an affidavit in this case?
Ms. Myers: Yes.
Mr. Black: Is that EXHIBIT #5 that you have in front of you?
Ms. Myers: Yes.
Mr. Black: And did you sign that affidavit?
Ms. Myers: Yes.
Mr. Black: And a, is everything in that affidavit true and correct?
Ms. Myers: Yes.
Mr. Black: Paragraph 3 you stated, My mother Becky Sue Myers had an ongoing
romantic relationship with a foster care boy Mike while both of them lived at the
my grandfather's home from about April 2007 through August 2007. Is that
correct?
Ms. Myers: To my knowledge, yes.
Mr. Black: How did, what a, what did you witness that caused you to believe that
Becky and Mike were having an ongoing romantic relationship?
Ms, Myers: They were together all the time. Uhm, me and my mom have had
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kind of a rocky relationship. And if I ever said anything at all like negative about
her towards her a, if we ever got in arguments about anything he would a, kind of
go off on me about it, kind of stand—
Mr. Black: Who would? Mike?
Ms. Myers: Mike, Mike would. And he would stand up for my mom. And a, and
they were always together. That's—
Mr. Black: Are you a, are you acquainted, you're acquainted with a foster child of
your grandparents, that was living with your grandparents named Mike. Is that
correct?
Ms. Myers: Yes.
Mr. Black: And do you knowr when he started living in the house with your
grandparents?
Ms. Myers: I, I believe it was around April if I remember correctly.
Mr. Black: What year?
Ms. Myers: 2007.
Mr. Black: Okay, And do you know how long he resided there?
Ms. Myers: he was there up until I believe September, late August, early
September.
Mr. Black: Okay. Have... During that time period did your mom live in the
house with your grandparents?
Ms. Myers: To my knowledge, yes.
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Mr. Black: Okay. How is it that you obtained that knowledge?
Ms. Myers: Uhm-Mr. Black: Did you witness them, her staying the night there?
Ms. Myers: Yes. And she, any time she needed to go home for something like
that's where she'd go. Like if she said she needed to go home to shower or
something like that that's where she would go.
Mr. Black: Okay. Did, do you know if she got any mail there?
Ms. Myers: Yes.
Mr. Black: Okay. In paragraph 6 of your affidavit you say, From April through
the present Mike and my mother have been in separable. They have always been
or always together whenever I see them.
Ms. Myers: Uh-huh (affirmative).
Mr. Black: Is that a true statement?
Ms. Myers: Yes.
Mr. Black: Where would you see them?
Ms. Myers: She would come to my apartment anct Mike would be with her. There
was a, family get togethers like birthdays and stuff like that when she would bring
him. And she, I would be at my sister's and a, she would come over and he'd be
with her there as well.
Mr. Black: Okay. Did they, was there anything about their behavior that you
observed that caused you to believe they were in a romantic relationship?
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Ms. Myers: The only thing I noticed is like he'd get mad a lot like really easy
with her a, like I guess like they would get in fights, but like I mean, as far as
noticing anything in their relationship, I mean, people get in arguments and stuff
in relationships. Friends don't argue and, and fight like that, you know,—
Mr. Black: So it wasn't like—
Ms. Myers: -thatoften.
Mr. Black: - it wasn't like friends fighting, it was like lovers fighting? Is that, is
that would you observed?
Ms. Myers: Yes,
Mr. Black: Was there an incident in May of 2007 when your mom went to pick
up, to pick you up from Smith's in Orem?
Ms. Myers: Uh-huh (affirmative).
Mr. Black: And a, when she got there did she tell you that she had to pick up your
grandmother's foster children as well?
Ms. Myers: Yes.
Mr. Black: And did she go to pick up those children?
Ms. Myers: Uh-huh (affirmative).
Mr. Black: Where did she go to do that?
Ms. Myers: She picked them up, I believe it was a, oh, it was on University
Parkway in Orem. I think it was a music store they have over there. I don't
remember what it was, I don't remember, it's FYE now or something.
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Mr. Black: Okay. So your mom was driving the vehicle. Right?
Ms. Myers: Yes.
Mr. Black: And where were you in the vehicle?
Ms. Myers: I was in the front seat when she picked me up.
Mr. Black: Okay. And when you went to get the boys did the seating
arrangement change at all?
Ms. Myers: Yes. She told me that I had to sit in the back so Mike could sit up
front.
Mr. Black: She didn't ask any of the other boys to sit upfront,just Mike?
Ms. Myers: Yes.
Mr. Black: And, and what was your impression about that behavior? What, what
was your immediate reaction to that a,~
Ms. Myers: I asked why. Like, like basically told her he could sit in the back.
And she said no, that he was sitting up front. And so I had to get in the back seat.
Mr. Black: Okay. At a, at the end of May 2007 was there a birthday party for
your niece and nephew at a park in Provo?

••%

Ms. Myers: Yes.
Mr. Black: And was it a family party?
Ms. Myers: There was friends there as well, yes.
Mr. Black: Okay.
Ms. Myers: Friends and family.
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Mr. Black: Did your mom go to that party?
Ms. Myers: Yes.
Mr. Black: How did, how did she arrive at that party? Did she arrive by herself?
Ms. Myers: She was with Mike?
Mr. Black: Just, just with Mike?
Ms. Myers: Yes.
Mr. Black: Was she with anyone else or just with Mike?
Ms. Myers: No. It was just her and Mike.
Mr. Black: And did, did you see how they arrived? Did they, did they come in
her car? Did they walk there? How did—
Ms. Myers: They were in her car.
Mr. Black: So it was just her and Mike in her car?
Ms. Myers: Uh-huh (affirmative).
Mr. Black: Arriving together at the party?
Ms. Myers: Uh-huh (affirmative).
Mr. Black: Did they leave the party together? **\
Ms. Myers: Yes.
Mr. Black: Did you think that was strange?
Ms. Myers: Yes,
Mr. Black: Okay. Why did you think it was strange?
Ms. Myers: Just seeing them come together alone to birthday parties, more than
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once they did. I, I don't see why Mike would come to a birthday party and not the
rest of the foster boys or, you know, every time that there was a birthday party
Mike and my mom would come together by no one else would be with them. Like
why wouldn't the other boys be with them if she was bringing one of them. Tr. at
114:22-25; 115: 1-24; 116: 17-25; 117: 1-18; 118: 8-25; 119: 1-25; 120: 1-25;
121: 1-15 & 121: 21-25; and 122: 1-7.
Testimony of Misty Lynn Myers Continued:
Mr. Black: Okay. In August of 2007 did you help your sister move?
Ms. Myers: I, I remember, I'm trying to remember. I did help her move some
things into a storage unit
Mr. Black: Okay. And did you see some of the things in the storage unit?
Ms. Myers: Yes.
Mr. Black: Did you notice in the storage unit some letters sitting on top of a
stroller?
Ms. Myers: They were pictures.
Mr. Black: Oh, pictures sitting on top of a stroller. What were they pictures of?
Ms. Myers: I don't remember correctly. Just drawings.
Mr. Black: Were there some items addressed to Becky from Mike?
Ms. Myers: Yes. It said like to Becky from Mike on them.
Mr. Black: Okay. Did you ask your mom about those items?
Ms. Myers: Uhm~«
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Mr. Black: Did you—
Ms. Myers: No.
Mr. Black: - - talk to her about those items?
Ms. Myers: No.
Mr. Black: In paragraph 10 of your affidavit, and maybe I'm asking the question
wrong, you say, When I later asked my mom about the letters she appeared to be
embarrassed and defensive. Did you later ask her about those items?
Ms. Myers: No. I, I remember she a, my sister had talked to her and she was
upset that I had seen them and a, she had said some things to my sister. And I, I
didn't talk to her about the letters.
Mr. Black: Okay. But, but your mom was upset that you had seen the items from
Mike?
Ms. Myers: Yes, she... Yes. Yes.
Mr. Black: Did you ask her if she knew what would happen if they got caught
together?
Ms. Myers: Yes.

-I

Mr. Black: And what did she tell you?
Ms. Myers: She just said she knew,
Mr. Black: And what did you interpret that to mean?
Ms. Myers: I just told her a, that if any, like if they got caught together that, I
mean, she would be in a lot of trouble for it. The only thing that she, she said was
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just I know what will happen so...
Mr. Black: That she knew what would happen?
Ms. Myers: Yes. Tr. at 122: 8-25; 123: 1-25; and 124: 1-4.
Testimony of Misty Lynn Myers Continued:
Mr. Black: Okay. Axe there times that you went to visit your grandmother and
when you went to visit you were told that your mom was not home?
Ms. Myers: Yes.
Mr. Black: And were you also told on those occasions that she had gone out with
Mike?
Ms. Myers: A few times, yes.
Mr. Black: Okay. Just the two of them together?
Ms. Myers: Yes.
Mr. Black: Would she sometimes visit you at your apartment or at your sister's
house?
Ms. Myers: Yes.
Mr. Black: And did she ever show up with, with anyone other than Mike?
Ms. Myers: There, there was a few times that she did have all the boys a, that she
was picking them up from, from school or the mall or something like that. The
majority of the time it was just her and Mike.
Mr. Black: Just the two of them together?
Ms. Myers: Yes. Tr. at 124: 5-24,
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Testimony of Taska Ruis:
Taska Ruis is Petitioner's Mother. Tr. at 126: 14-15.
Mr. Black: Did a, was there a foster boy named Mike that lived with you?
Ms. Ruis: There sure was.
Mr. Black: So she did go out with Mike by herself?
Ms. Ruis: She went to the store and right back. Tr. at 127: 2-4 & 127: 20-23.
Testimony of Burton Ruis:
Burton Ruis is Petitioner's father. Tr. at 134: 7-8.
Mr. Black: Was Mike also, Mike Hart also living with you at the time?
Mr. Ruis: Mike is a foster boy. There was five boys in my home. Not just Mike.
Five,
Mr. Black: Was Mike also living with you at the time?
Mr. Ruis: Yes, as a foster boy—
Mr. Black: Okay.
Mr. Ruis: - under the state. Tr. at 134: 22-25 and 135: 1-4.
Testimony of Burton Ruis Continued:
Mr. Black: And why was he removed from the home? Did he break a window?
Mr. Ruis: He not only broke the window, he broke the phone, he hit my doors,
and almost actually looked like he was going to hit me.
Mr. Black: Okay.
Mr. Ruis: So we had him recalled up.
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Mr. Black: Did he break a window in a car?
Mr. Ruis: Yes, he did.
Mr. Black: Whose car did he break a window?
Mr. Ruis: My daughter's car.
Mr. Black: He broke your daughter's window?
Mr, Ruis: He kicked it out
Mr. Black: I see. Was he angry at your daughter, do you know?

.,

Mr. Ruis: Evidently. I mean, he kicked his window out
Mr. Black: Okay. Did your daughter and a, Mike ever get in fights?
Mr. Ruis: Well, if I had known about it I would have sure stopped it That night
was, yes, she was in the car crying and, and a, and he chased car down, threw the
phone. Tr. at 139: 3-25 and 140: 1
*

*

*

Finally, the affidavits of Bryce Robert Myers and Misty Lynn Myers are attached in
Addendum as Exhibits "C" and "D" respectively, for marshalling purposes.
Evidence that does not Support the Finding:
Testimony of Douglas Hale Huntsman:
Mr. Barker: So, you, you just observed a, them for five days. Is that right?
Mr. Huntsman: Yes.
Mr. Barker: And did you even, did you ever see them do anything? Hold hands
or anything, kiss each other or anything like that?
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Mr. Huntsman: No.
Mr. Barker: Okay. And so my question, let me see if I can rephrase this better.
You a, you only observed them for five days. So you can't testify whether there
was any long-term cohabitation between Ms. Myers and this juvenile. Isn't that
correct?
Mr. Huntsman: That's correct. I saw them once. Tr. at 10: 12-24.
Testimony of Petitioner:
Mr. Black: Did you ever kiss Mike?
Petitioner: No.
Mr. Black: Did you ever hold his hand?
Petitioner: No.
Mr. Black: Did you have sexual relations with Mike?
Petitioner: No, I did not.
Mr. Black: Did you sleep in the same bed with Mike?
Petitioner: Never. Tr. at 37: 12-19.
r

Testimony of Respondent:

Mr. Barker: And her parents a, they, they take in foster children. Correct?
Respondent: Yes.
Mr. Barker: And so you've seen Becky with Mike a, but you've never, have you
ever seen them hold hands?
Respondent: No, no.
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Mr. Barker: Okay. So your yourself don't have any personal knowledge of any
cohabitation alone?
Respondent: No, I have not see them together, seen them sleep together or be
intimate together or anything like that. No, sir. Tr. at 91: 1-1L
Testimony of Bryce Robert Myers:
Mr. Black: In paragraph 3 of that affidavit you said that you did not have any
doubt that your mother Becky Sue Myers was having a sexual relationship with
Mike, a foster boy, during the time that both of them lived with your grandmother
from about May through August 2007. Is that, is that correct?
Mr. Myers: No.
Mr. Black: What do you mean no? That's not, I didn't read it correctly?
Mr, Myers: I don't have proof of the sexual relationship.
Mr. Black: You said you had no doubt. What was it in your mind that caused you
to have no doubt?
Mr. Myers: My understanding is they had a relationship. Tr. at 98: 23-25 and 99:
1-10.
Testimony of Bryce Robert Myers Continued:
Mr. Black: Okay. So, and your mom slept downstairs on the couch?
Mr. Myers: Downstairs on the couch.
Mr. Black: Did you ever... And so Mike had his own bedroom?
Mr. Myers: Yes.
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Mr. Black: With a roommate?
Mr. Myers: Yes.
Mr. Black: Did you ever encounter your mom and Mike downstairs on the couch
sleeping together?
Mr. Myers: Not together, no. Mike would come down to sleep on the floor and
she slept on the couch.
Mr. Black: So she would be on the couch and he would sleep on the floor?
Mr. Myers: Yes. Tr. at 107: 1-14.
Testimony of Bryce Myers Continued:
Mr. Barker: Bryce, Til be real short here. I just want to ask you one thing. Did
you ever witness Mike and your mother a, cohabitating together on a regular
basis? Were they living together somewhat like man and wife?
Mr. Myers: No. Tr. at 113: 10-15.
Testimony of Misty Lynn Myers:
Mr. Black: Did you ever witness Mike and your mother spend the night at your
;

grandparents'house?

-

Ms. Myers: No, I never witnessed that. Tr. at 117: 19-21.
Testimony of Misty Lynn Myers Continued:
Mr. Black: And during that party how did they treat each other?
Ms. Myers: They really didn't even sit next to each other at the party. Mike was,
he was like playing with my niece and nephew at the party. Tr. at 121: 16-20.
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Testimony of Taska Ruis:
Mr. Black: Okay. And a, did Mike and Becky have a romantic relationship?
Ms. Ruis: No, sir.
Mr. Black: Not at all?
Ms. Ruis: Not at all, sir.
Mr. Black: Did they ever go out together?
Ms. Ruis: They went out, but they had other people with them.
Mr. Black: They never went out alone?
Ms. Ruis: Once in a while they went to the store. She did it with my other foster
boys. Do you want me to bring all of them in and tell you?
Ms. Ruis: Mike was on a time limit They were proctor boys. I knew where they
was, I knew where they went. They had a trackers, they had therapists, they had
group therapy.
Mr. Black: Okay. How many bedrooms do you have in your home?
Ms. Ruis: I have three bedrooms.
Mr. Black: Okay. Do you and your husband sleep in one of the bedrooms?
Ms. Ruis: Yes, we do.
Mr. Black: Does anyone else sleep in that bedroom with you?
Ms. Ruis: No, they don't
Mr. Black: Who sleeps in the other two bedrooms?
Ms. Ruis: The other boys slept in the bedrooms.
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xMr. Black; Okay.
Ms. Ruis; And the bedrooms are right across from my bedroom by the way, they
are upstairs. Tr. at 127; 5-16 & 25; 128: 1-3 & 20-25; and 129: 1-6.
Testimony of Burton Ruis:
Mr. Black: Okay. Do you know of any reason why he would be angry at your
daughter?
Mr. Ruis: No, not really. Tr. at 139: 19-21.
Testimony of Steven Peterson:
Steven Peterson was a foster child staying at the residence. Tr. at 159: 1-4.
Mr. Barker: Okay. And you say you were a, roommates with Mike?
Mr. Peterson: Yes.
Mr. Barker: Did Mike ever talk to you about Becky?
Mr. Peterson: No. We never had discussion concerning Becky.
Mr. Barker: Did you ever see Mike and Becky together in bed anywhere or~
Mr. Peterson: No.
Mr. Barker: How about when you returned home in, back to the Ruises in the end
of July a, did Mike, did you ever had have a conversation with Mike at that time?
Mr. Peterson: Yes. I talked to Mike several times on the phone.
Mr. Barker: Did he ever talk to you about Becky at that time?
Mr. Peterson: No.
Mr. Barker: And you were back, again, you were back at the Ruis' house at this
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time, the end of July 2007. Right?
Mr. Peterson: Yes.

<

Mr. Barker: Did you, how often did you see Becky at that time?
Mr. Peterson: Maybe, maybe once or twice a week when we went to lunch with
Taska and Frank.
Mr. Barker: Okay. And did you ever see a, Becky and Mike together at that time?
Mr. Peterson: No.
Mr. Barker: Okay. Now a, did Mike have a, from what you witnessed did Mike
have a, a bad temper?
Mr. Peterson: Yes.
Mr. Barker: And how would he display that? Did you ever witness him
displaying that towards anyone?
Mr. Peterson: Several times.
Mr. Barker: Okay, Was it, was it to a, who, who was it towards that you saw?
Mr. Peterson: Towards everyone. He would, whoever was around us who he
would get upset at, if it was me, if it was Taska, if it was another boy that's who
he'd be angry at regardless of who it was. Tr. at 160: 2-25 and 161: 1-12.
Testimony of Shawn Louis Russell:
Shawn Louis Russell was a foster child staying at the residence. Tr. at 165: 22-23.
Mr. Barker: Okay. And would you ever see a, Becky with Mike together on a
couch?
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Mr. Russell: No.
Mr. Barker: Okay, And where did you sleep when you went there?
Mr, Russell: In the frontroom on the couch,
Mr. Barker: Okay. And so you were, you were on the couch and, and a, but you
never saw Becky and Mike together?
Mr. Russell: No.
*

*

*

Mr. Black: Okay. And you never saw Becky and Mike together alone?
Mr. Russell: No.
Mr. Black: Were they ever alone together?
Mr. Russell: Not that I saw.
Mr. Black: Not that you saw? Did they ever go anywhere in the car together?
Mr. Russell: Not that I saw, no. Tr. 167: 5-13 and 169: 14-21.
He

*

*

What is relevant here is that there is no direct evidence of a sexual relationship.
Even if the evidence that supports thefindingis taken to be completely true, at best it
shows that Petitioner and Mr. Hart may have spent some time together, slept in the same
room while Petitioner was on the couch and Mr. Hart was on the floor, stayed at the same
physical address for approximately four months, that Mr. Hart had a bad temper and may
have given some letters or drawings to Petitioner, Petitioner went to see Mr. Hart in Salt
Lake City once, and that the two appeared to act jealous from time to time. The
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affidavits of Petitioner and Respondent's children state affirmatively that there was a
sexual relationship, however, those conclusions must be based on evidence, and as seen
above, the evidence supporting such conclusions was inadequate. It is important to note
as well that Mr. Myers was obviously less than certain regarding his statements in his
affidavit and clarified certain statements at trial. For an example, see Tr. at 98: 23-25 and
99: 1-10. Further, the trial court itself stated in itsfindingsthe following:
There was a sexual relationship between Petitioner and Mike
Hart, which the Court infersfromthe common residency of
the Petitioner and Mike Hart, and which is corroborated by
the evidence that Petitioner elected to spend the night with
Mike Hart in Salt Lake City.
R. at 186: 16 and 185: 16. (emphasis added). Even the trial court indicates that there is
no direct evidence, but rather, that it inferred a sexual relationship. Id. None of the
witnesses testified that they had so^n Mr. Hart and Petitioner kissing, hugging or even
holding hands. Respondent had the burden of proving a sexual relationship, akin to that
between husband and wife, not that Petitioner and Mr. Hart spent time together. See
Haddow, 707 P.2d at 672 (requiring "participation in a relatively permanent sexual
relationship akin to that generally existing between husband and wife.") Therefore, the
evidence fails to support thefindingsof the trial court.
An examination of the case law regarding cohabitation also shows that the above
evidence is inadequate to support thefindingsof fact made by the trial court. In Siggy it
was admitted that sexual intercourse had occurred, specifically, it was admitted that
"Haynes had open access to her condominium, visited frequently and that they had
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intercourse." 905 P.2d at 911, n.4. Similarly, in another matter examined by the Utah
Supreme Court, the party who had lost the right to receive alimony, during direct
examination "admitted that early in her relationship with Dennis Warr, they did have
sexual relations and that she gave him a venereal disease." Wacker v. Wacker, 668 P.2d
533, 534 (Utah 1983). Consider also Garcia v. Garcia, where a party admitted that '"she
and Ellis shared a bedroom, bed, and had sexual contact at that residence/' 2002 UT
App. 381, If 2, 60 P.3d 1174. In Pendleton, sexual contact was admitted as well, "[i]n
this case, sexual contact has been admitted." 918 P.2d at 160, n.L Finally, the
cohabitating couple in the Haddow matter had "taken a vacation together to Hawraii,
'sleeping in the same bed and having sexual relations.5" 707 P.2d at 672.
The above cases show that evidence much more conclusive than what was
presented as evidence in this matter, was produced to show sexual contact. Specifically,
the above cases either contained admissions, or obvious proof that the parties had sexual
contact with each other, like taking an extended vacation while sleeping in the same bed
together, or infecting another with a venereal disease. In this case, the above cited
evidence simply does not rise to adequate proof to support the trial court's findings. In
order for the element of sexual contact to be satisfied, it must be shown that there was
"participation in a relatively permanent sexual relationship akin to that generally existing
between husband and wife." Id. Even if the evidence produced above could some how
be interpreted to show that there was sexual contact, it certainly does not show that it was
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permanent, or akin to that existing between husband and wife.2 As such, the findings of
fact of the trial court should be viewed as clearly erroneous.
2.

THE TRIAL COURT'S ULTIMATE CONCLUSION THAT THERE WAS
A SEXUAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PETITIONER AND MR. HART
WAS INCORRECT AND SHOULD BE REVERSED.
Sexual contact is defined as "participation in a relatively permanent sexual

relationship akin to that generally existing between husband and wife." Id. As was
stated above, the findings of fact in regard to any sexual contact between Petitioner and
Mr. Hart were clearly erroneous. Further, thefindingsof the trial court do not even
indicate that the "sexual relationship" was permanent, or that it was akin to one existing
between husband and wife. R, at 186: 14 & 16, 185: 16 and 17. Petitioner will not
reiterate what was already stated in the immediately preceding section. However,
because of the erroneous findings, the trial court's ultimate conclusion regarding sexual
contact between Petitioner and Mr. Hart was incorrect and should be reversed.

2

It should be noted that Petitioner in no way admits to having had any sexual contact with
Mr. Hart. The above statement should not be interpreted as an admission that there was
even infrequent sexual contact between herself and Mr. Hart.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Petitioner respectfully submits that the trial court's
decision to terminate alimony be reversed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / f y

day of July, 2009.

SMART, SCHOFIELD, SHORTER & LUNCEFORD
A Professional Corporation

EL M. BARKER
TREYA.CALLISTER
Attorneys for Appellant
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on this / f y a a y of July, 2009,1 hand delivered a copy of
the foregoing Brief of Appellant to Guy L. Black, attorney for Respondent/Appellee, at
the following address:
Guy L. Black
Greenwood & Black
1840 No. State Street #200
Provo,UT 84604
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GUY L. BLACK, No. 6182
GREENWOOD & BLACK
Attorneys for Respondent
1840 North State Street, Suite 200
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: 801 377-4652
Facsimile: (801) 377-4673
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BECKY SUE MYERS,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Petitioner,
vs.

Case No. 064400347
TRACY LYNN MYERS,
Judge Samuel McVey
Respondent.
This matter came before the Court for trial, the Honorable Samuel McVey
presiding, on July 1,2008. Petitioner was present and represented by counsel, Samuel M.
Barker, Respondent was present and represented by counsel, Guy L. Black. The Court heard
testimony, and arguments from counsel. The Court, having considered the evidence before it
hereby makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The parties in this matter were divorced on June 6,2006,

2.

Pursuant to the Decree of Divorce in this case, Respondent was ordered to
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pay Petitioner $1,200.00 per month alimony.
In the late spring and summer of 2007, Petitioner began staying on and off
at her parent's home in Provo. She testified that she spent nights there on
the weekends.
There is some dispute as to the number of nights Petitioner spent at her
parent's home. Some witnesses testified that Petitioner was an injfrequent
guest at her parent's home. However, a private investigator, Mr.
Hunstman, testified that during the peribd from June 26, 2007 through
June 30, 2007, he saw the Petitioner's car at her parent's home on four of
five days, or 80% of the days he had her under surveillance. The Court
finds the most credible and persuasive evidence to be that Petitioner spent
at least 80% of her nights at her parent's home.
On the 26th of June, 2007, Mr. Hunstman saw Petitioner leave her parent's
home in the early morning in the company of a young man fitting the
description of Mike Hart. He saw her drive the young man to
Independence High School. From this evidence, the Court finds that
Petitioner and Mike Hart had contact with each other on friendly terms.
The Court alsofindsthat Petitioner and Mike Hart probably spent at least
that night in the same house.
It is undisputed that Mike Hart resided at the home of Petitioner's parents
during the late spring and summer of 2007.

•--18?
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7.

It is undisputed that Petitioner received mail during the spring and summer
of 2007 at her parent's home.

8.

It is undisputed that Petitioner listed her parent's home as her address on
documents she submitted to the court in, a separate criminal case.

9.

Petitioner slept on the downstairs coakn at her parent's home, often
arriving there late at night

10.

Petitioner's parents did not charge her rent.

11.

Petitioner did not produce any credible evidence (e.g., rent receipts, bills,
etc.) to show that she was living at any other address during the spring and
summer of 2007.

12.

The Court believes that the most credible evidence before the Court is that
Petitioner's residence during the spring and summer of 2007 was her
parent's house.

13.

Petitioner was seen in a familial relationship, paired up with Mike Hart
and going together with him to events as a couple.

14.

Petitioner's parents tried to control Mike Hart and prevent any sexual
relationship involving Mike Hart. However, they were unable to control
him and prevent such contact between Mr. Hart and the Petitioner.

15.

On at least one occasion, Petitioner's son discovered his mother alone with
Mike Hart by the couch downstairs in the home of Petitioner's parents.

16.

There was a sexual relationship between Petitioner and Mike Hart, which
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the Court infers from the common residency of the Petitioner and Mike
Hart, and which is corroborated by the evidence that Petitioner elected to
spend the night with Mike Hart in Salt Lake City.
17.

The Court believes that the most credible evidence before the Court
indicates that Petitioner and Mike Hart had a sexual relationship.

18.

Respondent has been depositing his alimony payments with the Court for
the last few months.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1.

Petitioner established a residence at her parent's home during the late

spring and summer of 2007.
2.

Mike Hart resided at the home of Petitioner's parents during the late

spring and summer of 2007.
3.

Petitioner and Mike Hart had a common residency.

4.

There was a sexual relationship between Petitioner and Mike Hart, which

the court infers from the common residency of the Petitioner and Mike Hart, and which is
corroborated by the evidence that Petitioner elected to spend the night with Mike Hart in
Salt Lake City.
5.

As Respondent has established a common residency between the

Petitioner and Mike Hart, the burden of proving a lack of sexual contact shifts to the
Petitioner. While Petitioner denies such contact, her actions indicate otherwise. The
Court concludes that Petitioner has not met her burden to establish lack of sexual contact.
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6.

Pursuant to Section 30-3-5(10), an order for alimony in this case

terminates upon establishment by the Respondent that Petitioner is cohabitating with
another person.
7.

In this case a condition of cohabitation exists, and alimony should be

terminated effective January 31, 2008.
8.

From the funds on deposit with the Court, one-month's alimony, or

$1,200.00 should be paid to Petitioner, which will satisfy Respondent's alimony
obligation to Petitioner through January 31, 2008. The remaining balance on deposit
with the Court should be paid to Respondent.
DATED this

A

day of

u C T 6 k&

, 2008,

BY THE COURT: ,.,„...

/ A
(_•-

-~><^f

SA^MUEL MCVEY
/
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

SAMUEL M. BARKER
Attorney for Petitioner

1U.
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify I mailed, postage prepaid, by first class mail, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to the following, this

L

day of -Q CT

>

2008:

SAMUEL M. BARKER
5295 South Commerce Drive, Suite 200
Murray, Utah 84017

A.
>

x
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4TH DISTRICT
STATE OF UTAfrUTAH COUNTY

• GUY L. BLACK, No. 6182
GREENWOOD & BLACK
Attorneys for Respondent
1840 North State Street, Suite 200
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: 801 377-4652
Facsimile: (801) 377-4673
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BECKY SUE MYERS,
ORDER MODIFYING DECREE
OF DIVORCE

Petitioner,
vs.

Case No. 064400347
TRACY LYNN MYERS,
Judge Samuel McVey
Respondent.

This matter came before the Court for trial, the Honorable Samuel McVey
presiding, on July 1, 2008. Petitioner was present and represented by counsel, Samuel M.
Barker. Respondent was present and represented by counsel, Guy L. Black. The Court heard
testimony, and arguments from counsel. The Court, having entered its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, hereby ORDERS AS FOLLOWS
1.

Respondent's obligation to pay Petitioner alimony is terminated in this
case, effective January 31, 2008.

2.

The clerk of the court shall pay $1,200 of the funds on deposit with the

^X192
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Court in this matter to Petitioner, by making such payment payable to
Becky Sue Myers and Samuel M. Barker, and mailing such payment to
Petitioner's attorney, Samuel M. Barker.
3.

The remaining balance on deposit with the Court in this matter shall be
paid by the clerk of the court to Respondent, by making such payment
payable to Tracy Lynn Myers and Guy L. Black, and mailing such
payment to Respondent's attorney, Guy L. Black.

4.

The Decree of Divorce in this case is hereby modified, consistent with the
foregoing.

DATED this

h

•"

"

day of 0 C^ro

{ULJT~~

2008.

BY THE COURT: - . • ^ t

:'t^

SA&UELMCVEY
/
DISTRICT C O W JUDGE
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

SAMUEL M. BARKER
Attorney for Petitioner
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NOTICE
Please take notice that the undersigned will submit the above and foregoing document to the
Court for signature upon the expiration of five (5) days from the date of the mailing certificate
for this document, plus three (3) days for mailing unless written objection is filed prior to the
time.
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify I mailed, postage prepaid, by first class mail, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing ORDER MODIFYING DECREE to the following, this

J ^ /

/ V

day of

, 2008:

/

SAMUEL M. BARKER
5295 South Commerce Drive, Suite 200
Murray, Utah 84017
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K, ;:

GUY L. BLACK, No. 6182
GREENWOOD & BLACK
Attorneys for Respondent
1840 North State Street, Suite 200
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: (801) 377-4652
Facsimile: (801) 377-4673

O

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BECKY SUE MYERS,
AFFIDAVIT OF BRYCE MYERS
Petitioner,

.

vs.
Civil No. 064400347
TRACY LYNN MYERS,
Respondent.

STATE OF
COUNTYOF

•

)
ss:
)

BRYCE MYERS, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows:
1.

I am the adult son of Petitioner and Respondent in this matter.

2.

I have personal knowledge of the facts set forth herein, and if called upon to
testify, I would testify in accordance with this affidavit.

3.

I do not have any doubt that my mother, Becky Sue Myers, was having a
sexual relationship with Mike, a foster boy, during the time both of them
lived with my grandmother, from about May through August, 2007.

1

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

r.

Mike often spoke about Mom to me when he and I hung out together. He
spoke of her as his girlfriend. I saw them flirting with each other all the
time. They also slept in the same room together, although they tried to hide
the fact that they were sleeping together. Mom would go downstairs and
sleep on the couch instead of sleeping in her room. Mike would go
downstairs too. I caught him "sleeping" on the floor next to the couch,
while my mother was "sleeping" on the couch.
Sometime during May, 2007, Mike came to me crying because he had a
fight with Mom, because they were having a rocky time in their relationship.
He told me that he understood why Dad left Mom. He acted like a heartbroken, love-sick boy.
Sometime near the Fourth of July, 2007, my mom called me while Mike and
I were at my friend's house. She flew into a jealous rage over the phone,
because she thought Mike was hanging out with girls. She told me she was
done with him because he was cheating on her.
On several other occasions, the same jealous behavior happened. She had to
be with Mike all the time, or she became jealous. My mom was always
calling me when I was hanging out with Mike. She was always freaked out
claiming that he was with some other girl, instead of with her.
Sometime around August, Mike came to me and told me that he had gotten
into afightagain with my mom. He told me he had punched out the window
2
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of her car because he was upset that he had found a crack cocaine pipe in her
purse. It is common knowledge that my mom has had a drug problem.
>.

After Mike was removed from my grandparent's home, after their fostercare license was revoked, Mike was moved up to Salt Lake. My mom came
to me sometime shortly after the move and asked if she could take my car to
Salt Lake to see Mike because her car wouldn't make the trip. I called my
Mom the next morning because I needed my car to get to work. She told me
she had just left Mike's house and was on her way back.

DATED this Q\

day of ffcRtt

fifty

, 2008.

nryteJ^^S

Btb^E MYERS
Affiant

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this^l^day of ] _ J b r U Q t
2008 by BRYCE MYERS.

•SQ$g&PP\JBUC

4fa*0Mfe«tfbdfttoAMAM4bdflta

DAVD B»C 80CKAK*N
ftotory Public
State of Utah
My Comm. Expires Oct 11,201 O r
1012V/ 8Q0SPay*=snltf&4^2600f
^p^pp^gVM^^pffM4^pW^ppM|V«lM|^M4p)M

lu^

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ADDENDUM D

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

GUY L. BLACK, No. 6182
GREENWOOD & BLACK
Attorneys for Respondent
1840 North State Street, Suite 200
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: (801) 377-4652
Facsimile: (801) 377-4673
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BECKY SUE MYERS,
AFFIDAVIT OF RUSTY MYERS
Petitioner,
vs.
Civil No/064400347
TRACY LYNN MYERS,
Respondent.

STATE OF

)

COUNTY OF

)

ss:
MISTY MYERS, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows:
1.

I am the adult daughter of Petitioner and Respondent in this matter, '

2.

I have personal knowledge of the facts sti forth herein, and if called upon to
testify, I would testify in accordance with this affidavit.

DEFENDANTS
CASE NO.„
DATE;
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My mother, Becky Sue Myers, had an ongoing, romantic relationship with a
foster-care boy, Mike, while both of them lived at my grandmother's home
from about April, 2007 through August, 2007.
My mother had been living at my grandmother's home beginning in about
April, 2006.
In about April, 2007, Mike moved into the home as my grandmother's
foster-care child. He resided there until he was removed from the home and
my grandmother's license to care for foster children was removed in August,
2007.
From April through the present, Mike and my mother have been inseparable.
They have been and are always together whenever I see them.
In May, 2007, my mom picked my upon from Smith's in Orem, Utah. When
she got there, she told me that she had to pick up the boys (my
grandmother's foster boys). When she stopped to pick up the boys, she told
me I had to get in the back so Mike could ride up front with her. I thought
her behavior odd. Her interaction vvith Mike on that trip caused me to
believe that she had a romantic interest in him.
At the end of May, 2007, my sister, Lacy, had a birthday party for my niece
and nephew at a park in Provo, The party was just a family party. As my
mom was part of the family, she was invited to go to the party. She and
2
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Mike arrived together and were together throughout the party, sitting side by
side, and treating each other as though they were boyfriend and girlfriend.
They left together. I thought it was strange how my mom was acting around
Mike.
9.

In August, 2007,1 helped my sister move. She had things in a storage unit
that she shared with my mom, so we went there to get her stuff.

10.

While I was at the storage unit, I noticed letters sitting on top of a stroller,
addressed to Becky from Mike. When I later asked my Mom about the
letters, she appeared embarrassed and defensive. I asked her what was going
on between her and Mike. She told me it was none of my business. I asked
her if she knew what would happen if they got caught together. She told me
she knew what would happen. From that conversation, it was clear to me
that my mother was having a romantic relationship with Mike.

11.

Several times during the months my mom and Mike lived with my
grandmother, when I went to visit I was told that my mom was not home,
and she had gone out with Mike, just the two of them (which was against
Y.H.A. rules for the foster care.

12.

Also, she would sometimes visit me at my apartment or my sister's house.
She was always with Mike and not the other foster boys.

3
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13.

I recently learned that my mom and Mike are continuing to see each other,
even after Mike was removed from the home and transferred to a new place
in Salt Lake City.

DATED this

_ day of _

MISTY~MYEW
Affiant
^
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this^^day of Iff/irUd
2008 by MISTY MYERS.

l^TARYPUBLI
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UTAH STATE LEGISLATURE

Home | Site Map | Calendar | Code/Constitution j House j Senate | Search
Go To

TitJe/Chapter/Section:;

Utah Code
Title 78A Judiciary and Judicial Administration
Chapter 4 Court of Appeals
Section 103 Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
78A-4-103. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and process
necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
/ (2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals
from the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service
Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of
Forestry, Fire, and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural
Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the state or other local agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63G-3-6Q2;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a charge of a first
degree or capital felony;
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a conviction or charge of a first
degree felony or capital felony;
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons who are incarcerated or serving
any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first
degree or capital felony;
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of the Board of
Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first degree or capital felony;
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not limited to, divorce,
annulment, property division, child custody, support, parent-time, visitation, adoption, and paternity;
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four judges of the court may certify to
the Supreme Court for original appellate review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals
has original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63G, Chapter 4, Administrative
Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
Amended by Chapter 344, 2009 General Session
Download Code Section Zipped WordPerfect 78A04 010300.ZIP 2,947 Bytes
<< Previous Section (78A-4-1Q2)

Next Section (78A-4-104)»
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UTAH STATE LEGISLATURE

Title/Chapter/Section:

Home j Site Map | Calendar | Code/Constitution J House j Senate | Search

i^°M\

Utah Code
Title 30 Husband and Wife
Chapter 3 Divorce
Section 5 Disposition of property - Maintenance and health care of parties and children - Division of
debts — Court to have continuing jurisdiction - Custody and parent-time ~ Determination of alimony Nonmeritorious petition for modification.
30-3-5. Disposition of property - Maintenance and health care of parties and children Division of debts — Court to have continuing jurisdiction — Custody and parent-time —
Determination of alimony — Nonmeritorious petition for modification.
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders relating to the
children, property, debts or obligations, and parties. The court shall include the following in every
decree of divorce:
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and necessary medical and dental
expenses of the dependent children;
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the purchase and
maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance for the dependent children;
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5:
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of joint debts, obligations, or
liabilities of the parties contracted or incurred during marriage;
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or obligees, regarding the court's
division of debts, obligations, or liabilities and regarding the parties' separate, current addresses; and
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; and
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62 A, Chapter 11, Recovery Services,
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order assigning financial
responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of the dependent children,
necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the
circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately cared for, it may
include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide child care for the dependent children,
necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial parent.
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for the custody
of the children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, and for distribution of the
property and obligations for debts as is reasonable and necessary.
(4) Child support, custody, visitation, and other matters related to children born to the mother and
father after entry of the decree of divorce may be added to the decree by modification.
(5) (a) In determining parent-time rights of parents and visitation rights of grandparents and other
Members of the immediate family, the court shall consider the best interest of the child,
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer enforcement, the court may
delude in an order establishing a parent-time or visitation schedule a provision, among other things,
authorizing any peace officer to enforce a court-ordered parent-time or visitation schedule entered under
Ws chapter,
(6) If a petition for modification of child custody or parent-time provisions of a court order is made
" ^ denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the reasonable attorneys' fees expended by the
Prevailing party in that action, if the court determines that the petition was without merit and not
EJsserted or defended against in good faith.
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(7) If a petition alleges noncompliance with a parent-time order by a parent, or a visitation order by a
grandparent or other member of the immediate family where a visitation or
parent-time right has been previously granted by the court, the court may award to the prevailing party
costs, including actual attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing party because of the other
party's failure to provide or exercise court-ordered visitation or parent-time.
(8) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony:
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income;
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support;
(iv) the length of the marriage;
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring support;
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by the payor spouse; and
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the payor spouse's skill by
paying for education received by the payor spouse or allowing the payor spouse to attend school during
the marriage.
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining alimony.
(c) As. a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, existing at the time of
separation, in determining alimony in accordance with Subsection (8)(a). However, the court shall
consider all relevant facts and equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the
standard of living that existed at the time of trial In marriages of short duration, when no children have
been conceived or born during the marriage, the court may consider the standard of living that existed at
the time of the marriage.
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties' respective
standards of living.
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a major change in the income of
one of the spouses due to the collective efforts of both, that change shall be considered in dividing the
marital property and in determining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's earning capacity has been
greatly enhanced through the efforts of both spouses during the marriage, the court may make a
compensating adjustment in dividing the marital property and awarding alimony.
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves, and no children have been
conceived or born during the marriage, the court may consider restoring each party to the condition
which existed at the time of the marriage.
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new orders regarding
alimony based on a substantial material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the
divorce.
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for alimony to address needs of the
recipient that did not exist at the time the decree was entered, unless the court finds extenuating
circumstances that justify that action.
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent: spouse of the payor may not be
considered, except as provided in this Subsection (8).
(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial ability to share living expenses.
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse if the court finds that the payor's
improper conduct justifies that consideration.
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of years that the
marriage existed unless, at any time prior to termination of alimony, the court finds extenuating
circumstances that justify the payment of alimony for a longer period of time.
(9) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of the court that a party pay
alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage or death of that former spouse.
However, if the remarriage is annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume
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if the party paying alimony is-made a party to the action of annulment and his rights are determined.
(10) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse terminates upon
establishment by the party paying alimony that the former spouse is cohabitating with another person.
Amended by Chapter 129, 2005 General Session
Download Code Section Zipped WordPerfect 30 03 000500.ZIP 5,168 Bytes
« Previous Section (30-3-4.5)

Next Section (30-3-5.1)»
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Rule 24. Briefs,
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under appropriate
headings and in the order indicated:
(a)(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency whose judgment
or order is sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of the case on appeal contains the
names of all such parties. The list should be set out on a separate page which appears,
immediately inside the cover.
(a)(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page references.
(a)(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with parallel citations, rules,
statutes and other authorities cited, with references to the pages of the brief where they are
cited.
(a)(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court.
(a)(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue; the standard
of appellate review with supporting authority; and
(a)(5)(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court; or
(a)(5)(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial
court.
(a)(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations whose
interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to the appeal shall be set
out verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the pertinent part of the provision is lengthy, the
citation alone will suffice, and the provision shall be set forth in an addendum to the brief under
paragraph (11) of this rule.
(a)(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the nature of the
case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court below. A statement of the facts
relevant to the issues presented for review shall follow. All statements of fact and references to
the proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record in accordance with
paragraph (e) of this rule.
(a)(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably paragraphed, shall be
a succinct condensation of the arguments actually made in the body of the brief. It shall not be
a mere repetition of the heading under which the argument is arranged.
(a)(9) An argument The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the
appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue
not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record
relied on. A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports
the challenged finding. A party seeking to recover attorney's fees incurred on appeal shall state
the request explicitly and set forth the legal basis for such an award.
(a)(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought.
(a)(11) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is necessary under this
paragraph. The addendum shall be bound as part of the brief unless doing so makes the brief
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unreasonably thick. If the addendum is bound separately, the addendum shall contain a
table of contents. The addendum shall contain a copy of:
(a)(11)(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central importance
cited in the brief but not reproduced verbatim in the brief;
(a)(11)(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of Appeals opinion; in
all cases any court opinion of central importance to the appeal but not available to the court as
part of a regularly published reporter service; and
(a)(11)(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to the
determination of the appeal, such as the challenged instructions, findings of fact and
conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the transcript of the court's oral decision, or the
contract or document subject to construction.
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the requirements of
paragraph (a) of this rule, except that the appellee need not include:
(b)(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is dissatisfied with the
statement of the appellant; or
(b)(2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the addendum of the
appellant. The appellee may refer to the addendum of the appellant
(c) Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the appellee, and if the
appellee has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief in reply to the response of the
appellant to the issues presented by the cross-appeal. Reply briefs shall be limited to
answering any new matter set forth in the opposing brief. The content of the reply brief shall
conform to the requirements of paragraphs (a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of this rule. No further
briefs may be filed except with leave of the appellate court.
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their briefs and oral
arguments to keep to a minimum references to parties by such designations as "appellant" and
"appellee." It promotes clarity to use the designations used in the lower court or in the agency
proceedings, or the actual names of parties, or descriptive terms such as "the employee," "the
injured person,1 "the taxpayer," etc.
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the pages of the
original record as paginated pursuant to Rule 11(b) or to pages of any statement of the
evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g).
References to pages of published depositions or transcripts shall identify the sequential
number of the cover page of each volume as marked by the clerk on the bottom right corner
and each separately numbered page(s) referred to within the deposition or transcript as
marked by the transcriber. References to exhibits shall be made to the exhibit numbers. If
reference is made to evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy, reference shall be
made to the pages of the record at which the evidence was identified, offered, and received or
rejected.
(f) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs shall not exceed 50
pages, and reply briefs shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of pages containing the table of
contents, tables of citations and any addendum containing statutes, rules, regulations, or
portions of the record as required by paragraph (a) of this rule. In cases involving cross-
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appeals, paragraph (g) of this rule sets forth the length of briefs.
(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed, the party first filing a
notice of appeal shall be deemed the appellant, unless the parties otherwise agree or the court
otherwise orders. Each party shall be entitled to file two briefs, No brief shall exceed 50 pages,
and no party's briefs shall in combination exceed 75 pages.
(g)(1) The appellant shall file a Brief of Appellant, which shall present the issues raised in
the appeal.
(g)(2) The appellee shall then file one brief, entitled Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant,
which shall respond to the issues raised in the Brief of Appellant and present the issues raised
in the cross-appeal.
(g)(3) The appellant shall then file one brief, entitled Reply Brief of Appellant and Brief of
Cross-Appellee, which shall reply to the Brief of Appellee and respond to the Brief of CrossAppellant
(g)(4) The appellee may then file a Reply Brief of Cross-Appellant, which shall reply to the
Brief of Cross-Appellee.
(h) Permission for over length brief. While such motions are disfavored, the court for good
cause shown may upon motion permit a party to file a brief that exceeds the limitations of this
rule. The motion shall state with specificity the issues to be briefed, the number of additional
pages requested, and the good cause for granting the motion. A motion filed at least seven
days before the date the brief is due or seeking five or fewer additional pages need not be
accompanied by a copy of the brief. A motion filed less than seven days before the date the
brief is due and seeking more than 5 additional pages shall be accompanied by a copy of the
draft brief for in camera inspection. If the motion is granted, any responding party is entitled to
an equal number of additional pages without further order of the court. Whether the motion is
granted or denied, the draft brief will be destroyed by the court.
(i) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases involving more than
one appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated for purposes of the appeal, any
number of either may join in a single brief, and any appellant or appellee may adopt by
reference any part of the brief of another. Parties may similarly join in reply briefs.
(j) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant authorities come to
the attention of a party after that party's brief has been filed, or after oral argument but before
decision, a party may promptly advise the clerk of the appellate court, by letter setting forth the
citations. An original" letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An original
letter and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a reference either
to the page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the citations pertain, but the letter
shall state the reasons for the supplemental citations. The body of the letter must not exceed
350 words. Any response shall be made within 7 days of filing and shall be similarly limited.
(k) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise, presented with
accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and free from burdensome, irrelevant,
immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which are not in compliance may be disregarded or
stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees against
the offending lawyer.
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Advisory Committee Notes
Rule 24(a)(9) now reflects what Utah appellate courts have long held. See In re Beesley
883 P.2d 1343, 1349 (Utah 1994); Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Utah 1987)!
"To successfully appeal a trial court's findings of fact, appellate counsel must play the devil's
advocate. 'Attorneys must extricate themselves from the client's shoes and fully assume the
adversary's position. In order to properly discharge the marshalling duty..,, the challenger must
present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced
at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists."' ONEIDA/SLIC, v. ONEiDA Cold
Storage and Warehouse, Inc., 872 P.2d 1051, 1052-53 (Utah App. 1994) (alteration in original)
(quoting West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991)). See
also State ex re!. M.S. v. Salata, 806 P.2d 1216, 1218 (Utah App. 1991); Bell v. Elder, 782
P.2d 545, 547 (Utah App. 1989); State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738-39 (Utah App. 1990).
The brief must contain for each issue raised on appeal, a statement of the applicable
standard of review and citation of supporting authority.
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Rule 3. Appeal as of right: how taken.
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. An appeal may be taken from a district or juvenile
court to the appellate court with jurisdiction over the appeal from all final orders and judgments, except
as otherwise provided by law, by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the trial court within the time
allowed by Rule 4. Failure of an appellant to take any step other than the timely filing of a notice of,
appeal does not affect the validity-of the appeal, but is ground only for such action as the. appellate
court deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal or other sanctions short of
dismissal, as well as the award of attorney fees.
(b) Joint or consolidated appeals. If two or more parties are entitled to appeal from a judgment or
order and their interests are such as to make joinder practicable, they may file a joint notice of appeal
or may join in an appeal of another party after filing separate timely notices of appeal. Joint appeals
may proceed as a single appeal with a single appellant Individual appeals may be consolidated by
order of the appellate court upon its own motion or upon motion of a party, or by stipulation of the
parties to the separate appeals.
(c) Designation of parties. The party taking the appeal shall be known as the appellant and the
adverse party as the appellee. The title of the action or proceeding shall not be changed in
consequence of the appeal, except where otherwise directed by the appellate court. In original
proceedings in the appellate court, the party making the original application shall be known as the
petitioner and any other party as the respondent.
(d) Content of notice of appeal. The notice of appeal shall specify the party or parties taking the
appeal; shall designate the judgment or order, or part thereof, appealed from; shall designate the court
from which the appeal is taken; and shall designate the court to which the appeal is taken.
(e) Service of notice of appeal. The party taking the appeal shall give notice of the filing of a notice
of appeal by serving personally or mailing a copy thereof to counsel of record of each party to the
judgment or order; or, if the party is not represented by counsel, then on the party at the party's last
known address. A certificate evidencing such service shall be filed with the notice of appeal. If counsel
of record is served, the certificate of service shall designate the name of the party represented by that
counsel.
(f) Filing fee in civil appeals. At the time of filing any notice of separate, joint, or cross appeal in a
civil case, the party taking the appeal shall pay to the clerk of the trial court the filing fee established by
law. The clerk of the trial court shall not accept a notice of appeal regardless of whether the filing fee
has been paid. Failure to pay the filing fee within a reasonable time may result in dismissal.
(g) Docketing of appeal. Upon the filing of the notice of appeal, the clerk of the trial court shall
immediately transmit a certified copy of the notice of appeal, showing the date of its filing, and a
statement by the clerk indicating whether the filing fee was paid and whether the cost bond required by
Rule 6 was filed. Upon receipt of the copy of the notice of appeal, the clerk of the appellate court shall
enter the appeal upon the docket An appeal shall be docketed under the title given to the action in the
trial court, with the appellant identified as such, but if the title does not contain the name of the
appellant, such name shall be added to the title.
Advisory Committee Notes
The designation of parties is changed to conform to the designation of parties in the federal
appellate courts.
The rule is amended to make clear that the mere designation of an appeal as a "cross-appeal" does
not eliminate liability for payment of the filing and docketing fees. But for the order of filing, the crossappellant would have been the appellant and so should be required to pay the established fees.
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